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Book Reviews
Defense Studies
The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent Terrorism Myths
By Darren Hudson, Arie Perliger, Riley Post, and Zachary Hohman
Reviewed by Allison Abbe, professor of organizational studies, US Army War College

I

n 1983, Hezbollah drove explosives-filled trucks into the military
barracks housing American and French service members in Beirut,
Lebanon, killing 241 US military personnel and 58 French soldiers.
Thirty-two years later, 21-year-old high-school dropout Dylann Roof
shot and killed nine African Americans attending evening Bible study at
a church in Charleston, South Carolina, in an attempt to incite a race war.
To what extent do these attacks represent the same social phenomenon?
This question and others are addressed in The Irrational Terrorist & Other
Persistent Terrorism Myths, and the multidisciplinary perspectives of the
authors—an economist, a political scientist, a social psychologist, and a
special forces officer—are evident throughout the book.
In debunking myths about terrorism and counterterrorism, the
authors take a “meandering journey” through different social science
perspectives (135). Though meandering, the journey is short. At 140
pages, the book is a concise sampling of the state of terrorism studies
in the social and behavioral sciences. Sources include peer-reviewed
studies from economics, communications, conflict management,
criminal justice, political science, psychology, risk management, and
security studies. Rather than attempt to synthesize research across
disciplines, the authors present disparate theories and evidence through
disciplinary lenses, shifting among them throughout but returning often
to economics, the most prevalent perspective in the book, drawing upon
concepts of terrorist productivity, supply and demand, cost-benefit
analysis, and expected utility models.
In the insightful and well-written “Terrorists are Poor and
Uneducated” chapter, the authors clearly identify and disconfirm the
myth and provide a viable alternative explanation. They incorporate
research on the role of poverty and education in political behavior,
management perspectives on human capital challenges for terrorist
organizations, economic principles of supply and demand, the role of
societal institutions, and the importance of the rule of law in enhancing
stability and preventing terrorism from taking hold.
Unfortunately, other chapters are not as successful. The “Religious
Fundamentalism Is the Only Source of Terrorism” chapter does not
directly address the myth. The authors briefly mention terrorist groups
with identity-based and other motivations not religious in nature and
then focus on the motives and goals of Islamic terrorism—global vs.
local, religious vs. political.
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Other chapters address myths that may not really be myths, such
as “I Know Terrorism When I See It” and “Terrorist Organizations
Are Unsophisticated.” The authors fail to establish how these claims
represent widely held beliefs about terrorist groups. Instead, they rely
on anecdotal examples that are out of place in a book written by social
scientists. The text also falls short in its attempt to label state terrorism
a myth. The authors contradict themselves by offering examples of state
violence that meet all the criteria for terrorism outlined in the pages
immediately preceding.
Other chapters represent missed opportunities to offer meaningful
insights. In particular, the chapter on terrorist organizations reads like
a textbook, lapsing into a long exposition of organizational structure
and social networks that may not engage a general audience. Similarly,
in debunking the myth that terrorists are crazy, the authors catalog
psychological research into the personalities and motivations of
terrorists and offer a good snapshot of the research to date, but they do
not provide explanations useful to practitioners, policy makers, or the
public. While individual traits and characteristics have failed to identify
who will become a terrorist, situational psychological dynamics, whether
poverty, education, or mental illness, seem more promising, but have
received insufficient attention here and from researchers.
Similarly, chapter 8, “Four Critical Myths of Counterterrorism,”
offers few practical insights beyond the recommendation to include
defensive measures as part of counterterrorism strategy; however, the
historical perspective taken in the chapter does suggest the limitations of
counterterrorism policies and interventions attempted by governments
across the globe and helps chart a path for future research.
Ultimately, the authors do not demonstrate how an interdisciplinary
perspective provides insights into terrorism and terrorist organizations.
More a collection of chapters, the book offers little integration or
coherence across disciplines, leaving it to readers to sort out. There are
references between chapters but no attempt to synthesize the disparate
lines of research from different disciplines; integrate different levels
of analysis in societal, political, group, and individual perspectives;
or provide a central organizing framework. The authors dismiss the
need to do so, noting some issues are “too complex” for the book and
“people are complicated.” This observation applies equally to the state
of terrorism research.
The book is helpful in understanding the current state of terrorism
studies and the contributions that can be made by the different
perspectives of social scientists who tend to pursue their theories in
isolation. Given its breadth, The Irrational Terrorist & Other Persistent
Terrorism Myths may appeal to senior leaders already familiar with social
science research and to students in need of a good introductory security
or terrorism studies textbook to spark further interest in pushing the
boundaries of the social sciences.
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The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign
Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy
By Stephen M. Walt
Reviewed by LTC Joseph Buccino, US Army War College

I

n his engaging book The Hell of Good Intentions, Stephen Walt dissects
the post-Cold War failures of American national security, laying
blame with the foreign policy community for interventionist disasters,
fruitless deployments, and missed opportunities. He proposes an
alternative American grand strategy focused on select vital regions
critical to American prosperity. This book is a must-read for students
and practitioners of US national security affairs.
The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a period of rethinking
America’s role in world affairs. Having vanquished her greatest
adversary without firing a shot, the United States could finally heed
George Washington’s farewell advice and disengage from unnecessary
overseas ventures. America’s isolationist yearning dates back to its
founding, and as the world’s lone great power, the United States had
the opportunity to reverse the post-World War II trend toward global
military expansion. Instead, US interventions and global commitments
quadrupled from 1948 to 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
American administrations promoted democratic ideals, expanded
international treaties, and maintained enough forces and bases overseas
to bolster a liberal, rule-based order.
The results of such grand ambition according to Walt? Less than
30 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer
sits atop a unipolar world and maintains a “global military presence”
(24). Despite countless dollars spent on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
neither country is on a path to success. Since 1992, America’s national
security leadership has switched hands multiple times, but the primary
urge toward the global spread of liberalism has remained consistent.
Throughout this period, Walt, a renowned foreign policy expert
who teaches international relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School, has
been a critic of the foreign policy establishment. In his 1987 book,
The Origins of Alliances, he challenged the balance of power theory and
made the essential case for international relations realism, arguing states
should aggregate power and develop short-term cooperation agreements
against rising threats. Since then, he has published controversial books
and articles arguing against what he views as America’s impulsive and
wrongheaded support of Israel and proclivity for wasteful ventures in
the Middle East.
This book may be Walt’s best and most important work to date. He
recounts the post-Cold War foreign policy missteps of the United States
and holds the nation’s foreign policy establishment, which he defines
as senior military leaders, defense officials, senior members of the CIA
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and Department of State, think tanks, and national security media, to
account for perpetuating a series of failures.
Walt is courageous. He identifies the reporters, analysts, and
administration officials who maintain prominent positions in mainstream
foreign policy despite histories of blunders. Not mentioned in The Hell of
Good Intentions is the fact Walt has a better track record than the foreign
policy “experts” he criticizes. In 2002 and early 2003, he argued against
invading Iraq and remaining in Afghanistan and was ridiculed for his
view. Today Walt sits outside established foreign policy circles while
some of the advocates for those wars, such as Bill Kristol, Jane Harman,
and Richard Haass, all of whom publicly predicted a short conflict in
Iraq with a low-cost postwar reconstruction, now serve as prominent
foreign policy analysts on cable news.
Walt also rightly argues the US military no longer holds itself to
account at the measure the country should demand. Arguably, military
leaders have little to show for the remarkable blood and treasure spent in
the Middle East over the past 18 years, and the relief of senior military
leaders for poor performance is rare.
In the penultimate chapter titled “How Not to Fix U.S. Foreign
Policy,” Walt criticizes the current administration (217, italics in original).
He alleges the Trump foreign policy team has conformed to tradition
despite an unconventional public display and a series of promises to
drain swamps, refocus on internal problems, and disentangle American
forces and money from foreign wars. Walt has a point; there have
been no significant troop reductions in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the
Trump administration has authorized a series of new deployments to
Saudi Arabia.
In the final chapter, Walt offers clear-eyed policy prescriptions the
United States can follow to recover from its post-Cold War missteps and
allow for a more prosperous peace. He takes a neorealist constructionist
view of international relations and advocates for a policy in which military
force is used only in response to direct threats to American interests.
Short-duration, limited-focus troop deployments should replace nation
building and long-term troop buildups. Once a rising threat is subdued,
American troops should return home, leaving regime change and longterm occupation to others. While Walt has a clear agenda, he also points
out foreign policy establishment successes since the close of the Cold
War, including the Nunn-Lugar Program, the establishment of the
World Trade Organization, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Anyone interested in the development and implementation of
foreign policy should read The Hell of Good Intentions. It is one of the most
important books on foreign policy published in the last two years.
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Bombs Without Boots: The Limits of Airpower
By Anthony M. Schinella
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Nathan K. Finney, US Army

A

product of a Federal Executive Fellowship at the Brookings
Institution, Bombs Without Boots is a thorough analysis of the
effectiveness, or lack thereof, of both airpower and Landpower in
twentieth-century foreign military interventions. The author, a career
intelligence officer who participated in all of the case studies analyzed,
is well positioned to provide analytical and qualitative assessments of
a dominant approach to the Western use of power since the end of
the Cold War—the use of airpower to intervene in military conflicts for
strategic effect.
Schinella conducted his analysis through the examination of five
case studies tailored to survey the results of a military intervention
when it relied upon airpower and various levels of indigenous proxy
ground forces. The interventions Schinella assesses include Bosnia in
1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Israel/Lebanon in 2006,
and Libya in 2011. Each case study is analyzed in its own chapter,
involving different formulations of airpower and proxy forces, but
each supporting the overall thesis that “dropping bombs from the skies
without committing boots on the ground—at best may result in an
outcome in which interveners have little influence over the post-conflict
environment and at worst may lead to open-ended commitment without
having resolved the fundamental problem” (2).
The first case study, Bosnia, assesses a military intervention that
showed the value of highly capable proxy forces. According to Schinella’s
analysis, the fusion of NATO airpower and a capable Croat-Muslim
Bosnian ground force led to a successful end to the conflict, however,
the fact peace still stands is ultimately not due to airpower or the proxy
force NATO supported, but rather the 25-year peacekeeping effort by
Western forces. For Schinella, this indicates success can be tied to the
time, effort, and resources expended over a significant amount of time.
If not at the back door of Europe, it is unlikely Western nations would
support a continued peacekeeping effort.
In the Kosovo case study, Schinella describes the challenges of
working with a weak proxy force. Unable to overcome Yugoslav forces,
the Kosovar proxy force was still able to provide enough support to
an air campaign to force the former to the bargaining table. Neither
NATO airpower nor proxy ground forces were able to stop the ethnic
cleansing campaign or ultimately end the war, but both were required
to put enough pressure on Yugoslav leadership—and their Russian
supporters—to force a negotiated settlement. In the end, the war was
“achieved by multiple other elements that airpower made possible” (95).

Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2019
391 pages
$44.99

144

Parameters 50(3) Autumn 2020

Like in Kosovo, the initial intervention in Afghanistan relied upon
the limited options for allies on the ground. When the task involved
cleaning up the battlefield after American airpower destroyed Taliban
military forces, Afghan proxy forces were capable enough. As the
task shifted to the complex coordination of a small American ground
footprint and disparate Afghan militia forces against a prepared defense,
the weakness of proxy forces was highlighted. In the end, external
interventionist forces were unable to control the interests of the various
groups with which they were allied. According to Schinella, this trend
would only continue as interventionist forces were increased to come to
terms with the long conflict in Southwest Asia.
The Israel conflict in Lebanon in 2006, the only non-American
intervention covered in the book, is a case study in fighting without
proxy ground force support. Because of this, Schinella determines Israel
was unable to target accurately and degrade Hezbollah forces, even with
significant firepower applied to a small geographic area. When Israel
finally pushed ground forces into Lebanon to degrade enemy missile
and rocket forces attacking their homeland, both Hezbollah and the
Israeli Defense Forces took high casualties, but the latter lost more in
the area of public opinion, failing to meet the expectations of the Israeli
people. For Schinella, the Israelis were ultimately unsuccessful, but due
to international peacekeeping forces taking over security on the ground
and Hezbollah being pulled into the worsening civil war in Syria, an
uneasy peace has held since 2006.
Finally, Schinella assesses the Western intervention in Libya, which
shows the time and value in improving a proxy force. While airpower
was able to destroy key Gadhafi capabilities that would have crushed the
nascent rebel forces, it was the quick shipment and integration of foreign
military assistance by Western nations that allowed those militias to
overthrow the regime and take the Libyan capital. Like in Kosovo, says
Schinella, “this was not a victory by airpower, it was a victory made
possible by airpower” (286).
Throughout Bombs Without Boots Schinella is clear airpower played
a key role in modern military interventions, but the key determining
factor for long-term success is, as the strategist Admiral J. C. Wylie
has stated, “the man on the ground with a gun.” Schinella admirably
details different formulations of airpower combined with ground forces
and the possible causes for success or failure; however, his case study
selection may be one reason his assessments all support his theory. If he
had included the analysis of other conflicts that employed airpower and
a mixture of interventionist and proxy forces—such as the invasion of
Iraq, Afghanistan after the establishment of the International Security
Assistance Force, or the return of American forces to Iraq, and Syria,
to battle the Islamic State—his conclusions may not be as clear-cut.
With this in mind, Bombs Without Boots is an insightful and useful read
for anyone interested in the use of military force abroad. It would be
especially useful in professional military education courses where
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officers from different services—air, ground, and sea—could discuss
and debate Schinella’s conclusions.

The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned
to Fight the West
By David Kilcullen
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, an instructor at the Safe Communities
Institute, University of Southern California

T

he Dragons and the Snakes focuses on the twenty-first-century global
security environment containing dragons, state enemies, and snakes,
nonstate enemies, that are threatening the West and developing into
deadlier and deadlier foes through their continued military adaptation and
coevolutionary progression. A renowned counterinsurgency practitioner
and theorist, author Dr. David Kilcullen is a professor of international
and political studies at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, and
was the former CEO of Caerus Associates, a special adviser to the US
Secretary of State from 2007–9, and a lieutenant colonel in the Australian
Army. He has written a series of excellent books including Blood Year
(2016), Out of the Mountains (2013), and The Accidental Guerrilla (2009).
Kilcullen breaks new ground here. He wades into great power
conflict and, while he has extensive experience with snakes, his expertise
with dragons is more limited. The well-researched, well-written book is
interesting and benefits from Kilcullen’s theoretical smarts and extensive
time in the field as a military officer and later as a researcher. Its pace
moves quickly—less academic in nature, though well cited—and is meant
more for professional and mainstream audiences. There are few faults
with the book. Unfortunately, it is almost fully text based, with only a
few tables and figures evident and maps used as end-of-chapter curtains.
The book includes an introduction, a very brief note on terminology,
six chapters, an epilogue, acknowledgments, notes, and an index. The
chapters are: chapter 1: “The Dragons and the Snakes” (introduction),
chapter 2: “Adaptive Enemies” (the process behind nonstate enemy
adaptation), chapter 3: “Woolsey’s Snakes” (the context behind their
adaptation and mini case studies of al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Hezbollah), chapter 4:
“Liminal Warfare” (conducted by Russia), chapter 5: “Conceptual
Envelopment” (conducted by China), and chapter 6: “Ebb Tide of the
West” (conclusions and response guidance). Iran and North Korea as
smaller dragons (adaptive state threats) are discussed throughout and
primarily in chapter 3. The epilogue, A Better Peace? (in the spirit of
J. F. C Fuller), briefly touches upon the use of Western military methods
to promote liberty and prosperity. It also encourages a refocusing on
Western “societal resilience” and “domestic political reconciliation at
home” (254–55).
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Killcullen’s main arguments are “that the military model pioneered
by US forces in the 1991 Gulf War—the high-tech, high-precision, highcost suite of networked systems that won the Gulf War so quickly and
brought Western powers such unprecedented battle-field dominance in
the quarter century since then—is no longer working” and “what our
enemies have learned in the quarter century since Woolsey’s testimony—
how the dragons learned from the snakes, how the snakes copied the
dragons, how the rest learned to fight the West—and about what we in
turn must learn if we hope to succeed in the new environment we now
face” (6, 36). He draws upon the February 1993 US Senate nomination
hearing of R. James Woolsey Jr., as the director of central intelligence,
in which Woolsey used the emergent dragon and snake paradigm to
describe the threat facing the intelligence community (9–11).
The tipping point for the West, cited by Kilcullen as taking place
on March 20, 2003 at the Dora Farms complex outside of Baghdad,
represented the failed “decapitation strike” against Saddam Hussein
and his sons in an effort to stave off the Iraq War (217). The West’s
Dora Farms moment is equivalent to the Battle of Gettysburg for the
Confederacy in 1863 or, more appropriately, the Battle of Adrianople in
378 when the tide fully turned against the Eastern Roman Empire and
its legion-based military system. Resulting from the “Ebb Tide of the
West,” Kilcullen’s “so what” guidance initially delves into three strategic
response options: “doubling down” and rejecting the inevitability of
Western decline, “embracing the suck” and mitigating the worst aspects
of this decline like leading from behind, or “going Byzantine” and
retrenching and reconceptualizing our strategic position (228–37).
Of these three options, Killcullen only views “going Byzantine” as a
viable and pragmatic option for the United States and its allies to follow.
This entails “selective learning from the enemy” including the possible
utilization of decisive shaping, liminal warfare, and hypersonic missiles
(Russian); “cyber home guards” and remote engagement capabilities;
and the limited use of counter-hybrid operations (241–46). The intent
is to make Western forces, like Byzantine military units, extremely hard
to defeat with the staying power to engage in the long game, to wear
down opposing forces, and to compromise obliquely, politically, or
economically, as required.
The implications of this option find the United States (and the
rest of the West) in a strategic situation similar to the eastern half of
the Roman Empire during the epochal shift from the classical to the
medieval eras. Hence, this means a civilizational conflict approach at the
level of Toynbee and Huntington, and allied to Bull’s neo-medievalism,
underlies the author’s analysis (226–28). This reviewer, an epochal
warfare theorist who has made a similar argument for more than 30
years, has Kilcullen’s back in this regard. The West with its Westphalian
state structure has entered its twilight. A global civilizational shift
spanning technology, space-time dimensionality, economics, social class
structures, and others is now fully underway.
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The Dragons and the Snakes is first-rate, affordable, and extremely
timely. US Army War College and affiliated audiences will benefit from
the book’s strategic focus and gain insights into how the West’s foes
have successfully developed new methods and technologies that pose a
threat to the global security environment.
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Technology and War
Global Data Shock: Strategic Ambiguity, Deception,
and Surprise in an Age of Information Overload
By Robert Mandel
Reviewed by Dr. Scott S. Haraburda, US Army (retired)

T
Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2019
272 pages
$50.00

o make sound decisions, leaders today must understand the world
and seek ways to interpret the chaotic and distorted data filling it.
Logically, one could assume more data is better. Often times this is not
true. In Global Data Shock, Robert Mandel shows how leaders trying to
make better data-driven decisions encounter increased confusion, rather
than improved situational awareness, from the data deluge.
While big data analysis applies complex algorithms to infer
information from large amounts of data that cannot be obtained from
smaller amounts, Mandel argues leaders, overwhelmed with the large
amount of constantly changing data, are unable to rapidly and correctly
determine what is false. This overload facilitates strategic ambiguity,
deception, and surprise. Mandel challenges the validity of open-source
data, the need for obtaining more data to improve the reliability of
analyses, and the reliance upon internal experts for analyses.
Global Data Shock is simply organized into five chapters plus an
acknowledgements section, an introduction, a conclusion, notes, and
an index. The bulk of the book contains Mandel’s analyses of ten case
studies organized by theme. The case studies illustrate the rationale,
effectiveness, perceived legitimacy, consequences, and lessons of these
manipulation techniques. The book contains many difficult-to-read text
figures that add very little to the discussions; however, the tables in
chapter four provide an invaluable summary of the case studies and
highlight their background context, offensive manipulation, defensive
response, and strategic outcome. Quotations require readers to search
the endnotes to identify their source and why they are included. Valuable
nuggets of information, though difficult to locate, can be found
throughout the book, making it worth the read.
The current way of life is highly dependent upon data and the world
would collapse without it. This reliance upon data is a large vulnerability,
especially when people believe numbers and data analyses reveal the
truth. Tricking even educated professionals, fake news and other
misinformation are difficult to detect. With too much data—including
contradictory information—people now view reality as beliefs without
the need for verifiable data. As Mandel points out, this data deluge is
exasperated within the military community where command and control
decisions are based primarily upon millions of people using networked
computing devices across hundreds of installations globally. In addition
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to influencing combat power and technology, the control of information
has a large impact upon military actions.
Ambiguity, deception, and surprise are typical primary manipulation
techniques used in military operations that can be employed with relatively
short-term costs. High volumes of battlefield reports and analyses add to
the excess data available to leaders, making the information ambiguous.
Injection of false data and omission of critical facts lead to deceptive
information. Mandel shows how the failure of leaders to distinguish
between real data and noise leaves organizations vulnerable to surprise
attacks and can result in the loss of valuable resources and power.
Contradictory statements, fake news accusations, misuse of statistics,
and information overload decreases predictability. Often times, this
ambiguity is full of hostile, negative, and fear-provoking emotions.
Moreover, time pressure can impede one’s ability to fact-check data.
Befuddling both allies and adversaries, lack of clarity forces the public
to become dependent upon the biases of analysts while cherry-picking
information to support their personal opinions at the expense of
ignoring the truth.
This ‘“fog of war”’ will likely become denser with big data and its
systems vulnerable to hacking (11). To defend against manipulation,
organizations need the capability to extract valuable information from
conflicting data. Relying upon imperfect veracity and logic, data analytics
will not become a replacement for well-trained, experienced analysts.
Instead Mandel argues critical thinking skills, such as filtering out
false data, recognizing biases, and addressing knowledge gaps in those
analyses, will become vital. Combining qualified analysts and automated
data analytic systems is a valid way for organizations to counter databased manipulations.
Though Mandel is not persuasive in his arguments, Global Data
Shock—which should be read with a careful eye—provides beneficial
information to augment strategic offensive and defensive manipulation
plans. Senior military leaders studying relevant insights on the information
component of the DIME components of national power—diplomatic,
information, military, economic—will benefit from this timely book
and improve their understanding of how data impacts decision making.
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Deglobalization and International Security
By T. X. Hammes
Reviewed by Andrew Mumford, professor of war studies, University of
Nottingham, United Kingdom

A
Amherst, NY: Cambria
Press, 2019
290 pages
$109.99

uthor T. X. Hammes routinely sets up his analyses in fours. His
landmark text about the evolution of modern insurgency, The
Sling and the Stone, was grounded in the concept of “Fourth Generation
Warfare” and highlighted the decentralized nature of modern warfare.
Now he presents the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and its effect on
international security.
For Hammes, a distinguished research fellow at the National
Defense University and a former Marine Corps officer, this new
industrial revolution is a “convergence of breakthroughs in bioscience,
nanotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 3D printing,
clean energy and material science” (xi). His central thesis is this
revolution will provoke a significant reversal of the globalization of labor,
goods, and service. These economic consequences of deglobalization,
Hammes posits, will have an impact on international security because a
combination of these technological discoveries “is creating a new
generation of small, smart, and cheap weapons” that can be used by
violent non-state actors and rising powers to usurp the status quo
(xiv). The economic and political costs of expeditionary warfare will
proliferate accordingly.
Divided into eight chapters, the book begins with a whistle-stop
tour of the drivers of globalization and identifies the elements of its
purported demise. It then dives deeper into the different future
technologies that will combine in the coming decades to indelibly
impact the interconnectedness of societies and economies around the
world and, crucially effect the character of war. The second half of the
book, about the military impact of deglobalization and how US forces
can adapt, will be of most interest to readers. Although not explicitly
pitched as such, this book is a fascinating contribution to the discussion
on future warfare, and one that would appeal to Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency scientists and World Bank economists alike.
An avowed Clausewitzian, Hammes argues the nature of war will
still be rooted in the trinity, but future war will have a different character
due to the convergence of new technologies that can produce massproduced, low-cost weaponry. These technologies include off-the-shelf
drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and strike
purposes or AI-driven navigation systems that do not rely on GPS.
This section rationally demonstrates how technology and war gaming
scenarios that may seemingly belong in the fanciful realm of science
fiction are indeed scientific facts that are already reshaping the tactical
and operational levels of war on land, on sea, and in the air—as well as
in space and the cyber domain, too.
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Hammes admits in the introduction the book, in part, is a product
of pieces published in different venues over the past three years. If I
am being picky, I believe greater editorial finesse would have created a
more coherent whole to overcome the disparate parts. Not all chapters
have conclusion sections, and those that do exist are cursory—just two
sentences in one instance.
The intellectual curiosity and astute observations covering science,
technology, economics, history, politics, and military strategy packed
into the book, however, make it a compelling and thoughtful read.
Although replete with some fairly pessimistic assessments of such future
wars—they are, Hammes argues, likely to be “bloodier, longer, and more
financially ruinous” than those of today—the final chapter constructively
navigates a path for American forces to follow in order to adapt to such
changes (195). Hammes bluntly lays out the inescapable impact new
technologies will have on force structure and raises important questions
for military planners regarding shifts in investment from legacy systems
to new ones. His final rallying call is for ongoing American engagement
with its existing alliance partners; this engagement must come with
a reappraisal of its cost—which Hammes argues, could be reduced if
emergent technologies are harnessed effectively.
Overall, Hammes’ assessment of the economic drivers of current
and future change is convincing. His sketch of future battle domains
imbued with nanotechnology and swarms is profoundly plausible,
however, the political drivers of deglobalization are underdeveloped.
Decades of ever-increasing globalization have created conditions
that have exacerbated socioeconomic divides in countries around the
world, and these disparities have been exploited by populists. To this
extent, deglobalization is driven as much by the localizing nature of
emergent technologies as it is by a calculated political push in some
quarters toward isolationism. Deglobalization carries heavy economic
overtones, and Hammes concentrates significantly on that component.
Anti-internationalism is the politically charged synonym that remains
underexplored, and one that carries huge implications for international
security—as clashes between Washington and Beijing over the handling
of the COVID-19 pandemic testify. The process of deglobalization is
not an uncontrollable force.
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Regional Studies
The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad:
Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned
By David E. Johnson, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Brenna Allen,
Raphael S. Cohen, Gian Gentile, James Hoobler, Michael Schwille,
Jerry M. Sollinger, and Sean M. Zeigler
Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, retired professor of concepts and doctrine, US
Army War College
Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2019
292 pages
$49.95

T

he U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned—And Still to
Be Learned is a needed book. David Johnson and his fellow authors
focus primarily on the indispensable role the US Army played during
what they term, the Battle for Baghdad. The book is based on research
and analysis RAND conducted on contract to the Army with a goal to
“catalogue those hard-won lessons that are derived from action (and
inaction) by both civilian and military leaders so that US soldiers are better
prepared in future conflicts and are less likely to repeat mistakes made in
Iraq” (ix). The authors identify several lessons outside the purview of
the Army and focus on eight overarching lessons they view are within
the authority of the Army to implement. Details are not provided on the
nine authors, however, David Johnson and Gian Gentile are well-known
former US Army officers and scholars.
The eight overarching lessons for the Army and the authors’
recommendations are easy to find as they are placed up front in the
summary. The report is organized into seven chronological chapters
based on the major phases of operations in Iraq’s capital. After a short
introductory chapter, five chapters on prewar planning, occupation, the
Casey period, the surge, and withdrawal discuss the lessons from these
time periods which are summarized in the final chapter on overarching
lessons for the US Army.
Several of the lessons and recommendations identified for the
Army were not solely up to the Army to implement. Lesson one, “DoD
War Plans Need to include Actions to Ensure Long-Term Stability,”
recommends the Army be resourced with the requisite forces (ix, 203).
While Department of Defense (DoD) directive 5100.01 recognized the
Army’s function to occupy and provide military governance, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld denied either would be required in Iraq and this
decision had less to do with the Army “than with a failure of strategy and
policy” (41). Similarly, the Army could not provide the entire capacity
for the needed “whole-of-government approach” (212). While correct,
the recommendation the Army build more capacity in civil affairs
units faces stiff competition with other urgent internal Army force
structure priorities.
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Lessons four through six concern the Army’s task to train and
advise foreign military forces. The recommendations include further
institutionalization of Army units dedicated to tactical security assistance
of partner nation forces and institutional building at ministerial
levels. Since the writing of the original report, the Army has created a
Security Force Assistance Command with six Security Force Assistance
Brigades and an Adviser Training Academy that provide some of that
dedicated capability.
Lessons seven and eight focus on the Army’s preparation for
future urban combat and senior leader development. The Army proved
successful in innovatively and creatively addressing the complex
challenges of operating in Baghdad for six years, however, the report’s
recommendations for this lesson lacks specificity except to continue
studies of megacities. The report also criticizes Army professional military
education, especially the US Army War College and its failure to better
prepare Army officers for the complex situations units faced in Iraq after
2003. The recommendation of the authors for the Army’s education “to
provide better military advice and plans to civilian policymakers. . . . to
make better decisions” is short of specifics (xxi, 232).
While RAND conducted extensive research and analysis, the book
has several flaws. The first and most significant flaw is the long delay
in the release of the book. Most analysis, terminated in 2015, was not
significantly updated prior to publication in late 2019. As the authors
note, the Army had already implemented some of the recommendations
and failed to heed others. For example, while lesson three recommends
the Army provide robust division, corps, and theater army operationallevel headquarters capable of planning and conducting combat and
stability functions, the Army reduced these headquarters by an average
25 percent after 2014. As such, the book does not consider The U.S.
Army in the Iraq War (2 volumes), the entire revision of Army doctrine
in July 2019, or the emergence of the new Army concept of multidomain operations. The book is also overly focused on operations in
and around Baghdad.
Regardless of this criticism, The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad:
Lessons Learned—And Still to Be Learned is a valuable reference for serious
students of the recent history of the US Army. What is still needed,
however, is a broader companion report of the US Army in the entire
war in Iraq with better articulated recommendations.
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istory, often said to have been written by the winners, has not been
kind to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS)—
Japan’s effort to “use our power to create the world’s new order” in
the words of then-Prime Minister Konoe in 1940 (3). With the West
in apparent decline, and American and British dominance in jeopardy,
Japan’s imperial dreams expanded to centrality in international affairs:
beginning with the liberation of the peoples of the Orient from the
shackles of Western Europe and ridding the region of “the white race
bloc” (4). By 1941, the GEACPS dominated discourse and became the
sphere’s central goal until Japan’s final defeat four years later.
For this impressive analytical history of the period, author Jeremy
Yellenan—assistant professor of Japanese studies at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong—conducted extensive archival research in
Japan, Burma, the Philippines, Britain, and the United States. He sees
the GEACPS as a sincere attempt to envision a new political order for
the region during a time of global crisis. Although highly oppressive and
domineering, the GEACPS had the active cooperation of nationalist
elites across the region—“patriotic collaborators” whose motives,
liberation from the colonialism of Great Britain (India and Burma) and
the United States (the Philippines)—were quite different from those
of Japan (20).
Yellen’s research shows Japan’s fear the Nazi regime would expand
into Asia was key to its decision to sign on to the Tripartite Pact with Italy
and Germany. As Germany gained ascendancy over much of Europe,
influential members of Japan’s foreign policy establishment began to
suspect Berlin would seek to control the French and Dutch colonies in
East Asia. Forming an alliance with Germany was a way to preclude this,
with the pact not simply an agreement among fascist-leaning states. This
choice explains the apparent contradiction between Japan entering into
an alliance with two Western states even as it sponsored a regional order
based on anti-Westernism.
Another surprise to emerge from Yellen’s research was how little
thought Japan had given to the operation of the new empire. Critics
pointed out the only difference was that Japan would be the ruler rather
than the West. Only after Pearl Harbor, and more than a year after
Konoe announced the creation of the GEACPS, was there an attempt
to consider how the new empire should be constructed.
In early 1942, an investigative committee was created and charged
with developing a 10-year plan for greater East Asia. Although there
was consensus that Japan would stand at the apex of this imagined
community, major differences of opinion existed on which component
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parts were to be protectorates, which were to be directly controlled by
Japan, and the degree to which they should be free to interact directly
with each other to meet their national needs as opposed to going through
Tokyo. Yellen observes there was the naïve expectation Japan, without
first winning the hearts and minds of the occupied territories, could
create a subservient relationship.
The bulk of Yellen’s analysis focuses on Burma and the Philippines.
Each country had received a degree of political autonomy from its
colonizers and both were able to maintain a degree of independence
within the GEACPS since policy makers in Tokyo saw no long-term
benefit to direct colonial control of either. Elites in each country
wanted independence, and while the Burmese actively accommodated
Japanese forces to ensure liberation from the British Empire, the
Filipinos envisioned themselves in partnership with a caretaker regime:
cooperating to secure gains from Japan or, should the United States
return, a grant of independence they saw as inevitable.
Meanwhile, the elites made use of their limited independence to
begin state building. In Burma, the Japanese military helped create a
defense establishment, even introducing its rigorous training standards
to the Burma National Army. As Japan suffered reverses on the
battlefield, its demands on its colonies grew, even as by 1943 it was
ready to promise full independence. This proved insufficient, since the
territories could see which way the battlefield wind was blowing. The
Philippine government resisted pressure to declare war on the United
States, and the Burmese military—in a stunning defeat for Japanese
efforts—revolted against Japan and courted aid from its former
British overlords.
In an improbable twist of fate at war’s end, the nationalist elites
found themselves in Sugamo Prison, along with Class A war criminals
such as former Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki. Isolated from them, the
erstwhile collaborators held spirited conversations—in English, their
only common language—about who was more understanding, generous,
and democratic, the Americans or the British (206).
Military officers will find much to ponder in this well-written
book—how idealism can come athwart reality and even the best-laid
plans can go astray, how allies may prove illusory, and how victory
does not mean peace. Treaties were hardly signed when the Cold War
turned areas of decolonization into theaters of conflict between liberal
democratic and communist power blocs.
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ontemporary Security Issues in Africa is a thorough and well-researched
primer for anyone new to Africa and the security challenges plaguing
the continent since the colonial powers began to recede. It effectively
describes the key strategic-level sources of instability with two national
case studies and illustrates fragility, ethno-religious conflict and civil wars,
natural resource and environmental security, violent extremism, maritime
security, food security, and extreme poverty. For anyone observing Africa
over the past 10 years, the primer is a useful summary with very little new
information provided.
The narrative contains repetitive information one more edit
might have resolved and relies on old sources and information,
such as commentary that companies are still awaiting clarity on the
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010. This is from a 2012 Congressional Research
Service report; one would assume companies have determined in the
past 10 years how the legislation affected their business.
The chapter on international involvement presents two case studies,
one focused on the United States and the formation of US Africa
Command 13 years ago, and one focused on China and its well-known
infrastructure and other investments. Both topics have been studied
endlessly by scholars with entire books about each. In some of the case
studies on specific challenges, the author mentions involvement by other
countries, with one paragraph each on Turkey and Brazil. The author,
for instance, could have discussed the massive recent investments in
Somalia alone by Turkey, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates. Brazil,
like Colombia, recently became a security exporter and drastically
increased its participation in peacekeeping which has brought greater
Brazilian interest to Africa.
Nigeria, moreover, is described as historically stable, when the
country has experienced nearly a dozen coups since achieving its
independence in 1960 and has dealt with violence and rioting, plus
the Biafran civil war and Niger Delta militant actions, that have killed
hundreds over the years, even before Boko Haram began its murderous
campaigns in earnest in 2009.
The linkages described in the final chapter are also well-known:
corrupt elites amassing wealth and power from natural resource
exploitation, the franchising of top terrorist brands, ethnic conflict
masking violence over resources, and the looming environmental and
natural resource threats. The brief section on future prospects in the final
chapter, which should include clear recommendations to mitigate the
challenges described, simply states that understanding these challenges
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is the first step to their resolution and that ultimately they can only
be managed through “coordinated national, regional, and international
efforts” (147). Details about these efforts are scant, only that they should
“ensure a safe and secure environment within which necessary political,
economic, and social reforms can occur” (147).
Most obviously missing from the book’s catalog of challenges is
poor governance, the critical uniting factor for all these issues and a
term that hardly appears in the text. Social reforms cannot occur without
a complete reimagining of what governance means in Africa and the
recognition by ruling bodies and individuals of their responsibility to
ensure human security for all people within their charge, rather than
financial security only for their extended family or clan.
The African Union, the Economic Community of West African
States, and other regional groups are beginning to take the lead on key
security challenges, as noted by Taylor, but they are doing so because
many African countries are not improving governance on their own as
it does not seem to be in their best interest to do so. External incentives
may be needed, and regional structures may be effective vehicles for
this change as they have more legitimacy in aggregate than do their
constituent countries, but Taylor does not explore this phenomenon
outside of listing individual efforts in specific case studies.
Taylor does touch upon some hopeful demographic prospects
including young populations and urbanization. Younger populations
have been the hope to save Africa for two decades. Their increasing
education and desire for prosperity leads them to the cities where
they either end up in the slums or through infinite combinations of
networks, good luck, and hard work, they become urbane, multicultural,
and focused away from sources of conflict, seeking stability for greater
economic opportunity and development. Observers have also placed
hope in younger leaders who have been untouched by the struggles
for independence that often leads to ethnic division and militancy in
leadership. Youth bulges and urbanization, however, produce multitudes
of young people for whom prosperity is a distant dream. Instead of
prosperity they are drawn into criminality, predation, violence, and
instability and are unlikely to demand or command change.
Contemporary Security Issues in Africa is an excellent book for anyone
who needs to catch up on what has been happening in Africa. It provides
a concise review of the key challenges, the historical context of their
causes, and the mitigation efforts undertaken. For experts who need
thoughtful answers to these challenges, the book will have little value
except as an easy reference guide.
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uthor Michael Shay has done yeoman’s work in recovering the
outlines of the life and career of Lieutenant General Hunter
Liggett, arguably the most capable general in the American Expeditionary
Force (AEF) of World War I. During the Great War, Liggett commanded
a division and then a corps before replacing General John J. Pershing
as commander of the US First Army, a move meant to allow Pershing
to focus on his strategic duties as the overall American commander.
As Shay notes, Pershing, however, was initially unwilling to relinquish
his operational role; the possessive chief kept returning to First Army
headquarters and giving direction as if there had been no change.
After several days of this, Liggett tactfully let Pershing know
he was being a micromanaging nuisance. Liggett was then—
largely—left to command his forces for the remaining weeks of the
war. This incident reveals qualities Shay highlights throughout this
biography: Liggett’s unquestioned competence paired with a deft,
unassuming personal touch that brought out the best in superiors,
peers, and subordinates. These traits were widely acknowledged by
his contemporaries, and that high reputation remains the consensus
among historians today.
Nonetheless, until now, Liggett has lacked a full-length academic
biography, likely in part due to the dearth of sources. His two memoirs
focused on the Great War, providing only glimpses of the remainder
of his nearly 46-year military career. Neither did the childless Liggett
leave a trove of letters, diaries, or other papers to the care of family
or a public institution. In terms of primary source material, Shay
relied mainly on the official personnel file, Liggett’s two books, the
memoir of his wartime aide-de-camp, and the papers of a miscellany
of some surrounding figures.
This thin base of evidence gives the chronological outline of
Liggett’s life but yields only the occasional glimpse of his deeper
nature. Indeed, Shay goes to such lengths to wring everything he
can from the available records that he includes some facts best left
unrecorded—for instance, the distances of various routine training
marches undertaken by Liggett’s company on the frontier or trivial
itinerary details of trips taken or hosted while in command of
occupation troops after the war. These faithfully recorded facts
provide no meaningful insights into how an outstanding soldier
either developed from youth or employed honed skills in maturity.
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The absence of these deeper lessons from Liggett’s early career
is a pity. He had many fascinating experiences before arriving in
France that would be of great interest to scholars and practitioners
alike. Liggett was a lieutenant for 18 years in the 1880s and 1890s, a
period of US Army history that has not received sufficient attention.
Did such a long apprenticeship help or hinder the development of
someone who would command hundreds of thousands of troops?
After just a year as a regular army captain, Liggett received a
temporary promotion to major for service with volunteers in the
training camps for the Spanish-American War and then in the field
for the Philippine-American War. How did this service with citizen
soldiers influence his outlook?
One of the more revealing anecdotes—and one already recorded
within the secondary literature—comes from then Major Liggett’s
time as part of the Fort Leavenworth garrison in the early 1900s.
Several years earlier, the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root
remade the Army’s professional education system.
To take advantage of these revitalized schools, Liggett audited the
course taught by then First Lieutenant George C. Marshall—more
than two decades his junior—subordinating any personal vanity to
professional zeal. This might have been his best preparation for later
high command: the curriculum focused on corps- and division-level
tactics using German textbooks that happened to employ problems
set in the region of France destined to fall within the AEF sector.
Unsurprisingly, the best chapters are those covering the First
World War. Shay documents some of the significant controversies of
the war from the perspective of Liggett, such as the relief of Major
General Clarence R. Edwards and the confused “race for Sedan.”
Throughout, Shay favorably contrasts the firm yet calm hand of
Liggett to the demanding, domineering Pershing. Indeed, Liggett
was nearly one of the many senior officers Pershing either rejected
outright or quickly sacked for a perceived lack of physical vigor.
Ultimately, the skeptical Pershing’s decision to retain Liggett was
vindicated despite his girth.
Liggett’s famous admission of being overweight, documented
in Edward M. Coffman’s The War to End All Wars: The American
Military Experience in World War I, is a triumph of sly self-effacement:
“Unquestionably, there is such a thing not only as being too old to
fight, but too fat. That disqualification is the more serious if the fat
is above the collar” (250).
Hunter Lig gett provides a sound overview of the career of an
important figure in US Army history. It will be useful to historians
as an authoritative biography for citation. Military professionals and
history buffs seeking a quick introduction to aspects of the AEF
will also profit. Specialist readers seeking fresh insights into the
frontier, the Progressive Era Army, or military leadership will have to
look elsewhere.
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Shay elected to keep a tight focus on Liggett rather than taking
the “life and times” approach of Allan Millett’s classic biography
of the Second Army commander, The General: Robert L. Bullard and
Officership in the U.S. Army, 1881–1925. That more expansive method
uses the subject of the biography as a vehicle to advance academic
or professional knowledge more broadly than an individual life.
Shay competently delivers the book he set out to write, however, by
declining the far more ambitious task of placing Liggett within the
larger context of the era, he left room for a definitive biography still
to come.

